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Abstract 
Korean unification is a concept that seems impractical and unwanted by the Republic of Korea. Yet 
the government continues to purport its desire for it, primarily romanticising a reunited Korean 
bloodline. This project analyses the reasons and causes for this continued use of ethnic nationalism 
and explore how it shapes the very meaning of unification. Primarily, it is a speech act incorporated 
into the larger foreign policy of the Republic of Korea, mobilised for self-promotion and achieving its 
own interests. 
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1. Introduction 
Korea remains one of the last divided nations on earth, a remnant of the Cold War. There 
have been several proposals for reconciliation, integration, and eventual unification. These attempts 
have ended in failure, yet attempts continue. Despite the clear ideological opposition and frozen 
military standoff, a constant reaffirmation of commonality binds them together. In being divided, 
politicians in the DPRK and the ROK view the other as the same people, using themes of ethnic unity 
and cultural homogeneity in both domestic and international stages, despite being separated for 72 
years. This is a presumption integral to mainstream political culture on the Korean peninsula. In policy 
documents and public speeches, political actors in the ROK consistently muse over the damage and 
pain of a divided Korea. What purpose does this discourse serve for international audiences? At first 
glance, appeals to shared history of mythology, unity, and bloodline have no bearing on the US 
Department of State, for example, yet there must be a reason for conveying pain. Looking at the ROK, 
in appealing to a primal, romantic sense of ethnic nationalism and entitlement to unification, policy 
makers may be expressing frustration at the present circumstances or indicating their will to lead in 
diplomatic efforts as opposed to follow the status quo with the US. This discourse does not appear in 
isolation, the context and subjects in which it is used is also relevant to analyse its ultimate purpose. 
This project will not assess the efficacy of unification policies, as academics have undertaken before, 
but will track the changes in the ontology of unification and ethnic nationalism's role in this. 
This project will focus on late 20th/early 21st century (1996-2016) ROK governmental policies 
on unification before, during, and after the most consistent rapprochement policy with the DPRK, 
President Kim Dae-jung’s "Sunshine policy"1. Observing this policy is relevant today as the incumbent 
President, Moon Jae-in follows in similar footsteps to Kim Dae-jung2. Already President Moon 
engaged in rapprochement through sports, reconnecting direct phone lines, sending ministers to 
Pyongyang, and hosting Chairman Kim Jong-un in Panmunjom. Still much needs to be done, but by 
analysing the speech acts in promoting policies and approaches taken to unification during Sunshine, 
one can learn and understand how and why Seoul expresses a will to unify, even if it is a façade. 
                                                           
1 The three principles of the Sunshine Policy are:  
1) No tolerance of military provocation by North Korea. 
2) No absorption of the North by the South. 
3) Active promotion of reconciliation and cooperation. 
(MOU, 2002: 15)  
2 The most in-depth speech given by President Moon is retrieved from: Bae H-J (2018) 
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Additionally, by looking at the surrounding circumstances and seeing the effect these had on the 
creation of unification documents, one can begin to understand when certain discourse is applied and 
the intention behind it. The period of investigation has several events relevant to the trajectory of the 
inter-Korean and US relationship that the author will consider as relevant to the causes and intentions3.  
a. The Current State of the Peninsula and Overarching Question 
 In April 2018, President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un shook hands over the 
demarcation line separating the two Koreas and walked to the South side of Panmunjom, taking a 
picture in front of a Mt. Geumgang painting (see Figure 1). These images have resonated across the 
world and talk of rapprochement and unification returns to mainstream political discourse. How did 
this happen? It was merely months ago that the DPRK tested its largest missile ever, the Hwasong-
15, and commentators argued it was “too late” to prevent a war (Nolet, 2018).  
 
Figure 1: President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un shake hands in front of a picture of Mt. Geumgang in 
Panmunjom (26th May 2018) source: Xinhua Net (2018) 
Although to many the Panmunjom meeting came as a surprise, the inroads developed for 
reconciliation and collaboration are over a decade in the making. Regardless of conservative 
administrations, nuclear tests, or the turns in the US-ROK military alliance, the facilities and language 
                                                          
3 See Appendix A (timeline) for a list of events from 1990-2018. 
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the two Koreas use to approach each other remains enshrined in international relations. Like a spectre, 
romantic discourse of tragic Korean separation, cultural and ethnic homogeneity lingers in 
publications and speeches.  
There is an effect on the US stature as well. The US President moved from threatening “fire 
and fury”4 upon Pyongyang and forcible regime change, to holding the first ever high-level meeting 
between the two leaders. The speed at which diplomacy moves between the Koreas is unique, and the 
ROK has an uncanny influence on US security posture. Noting the changes in the security 
environment on the Korean peninsula: why is the speed of diplomacy so swift?  
  
                                                           
4 “Remarks by President Trump Before a Briefing on the Opioid Crisis”. The White House. Retrieved from: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-briefing-opioid-crisis/. Accessed 1st July, 
2018 
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2. Literature Review 
a. Previous work on Sunshine and ethnic nationalism 
To understand ethnic nationalism interwoven in ROK policy, it is useful to explore theories 
on its nature and operation. The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Smith, 1987) provides an extensive and 
historical account on the origins of the nation, ethnicity, and the connection to myths, events, symbols, 
and stories. The accounts described in this book helped the author understand both the gravity and 
the staying power of these myths. In turn, this helped provide an explanation as to why the two Koreas 
rhetorically have pushed, and continue to push, for national cohesion for so many decades. Gellner 
bases his conception of nationalism on consistency across the political state, replacing “complex 
structure of local groups” (1983: 57). Anderson largely concurs but adds that identity formation is 
initiated by incorporating and absorbing distinct cultures, later appropriating their culture as an integral 
part of the new identity (2006: 201). With Korea, the states in question are ostensibly of the same 
people, with similar cultures but heterogeneous elements would need to be accommodated into a 
larger identity. In a similar vein, constructing a coherent identity of “Korean” with over 70 million 
adherents would have a significant voice on the global stage.  
Connor rebukes Anderson’s and Gellner’s hypothesis of incorporation as it assumes that 
ethnic strife cannot exist within a nation (Connor, 1994: 70); making “nation-building” a misnomer 
(71). Supplanting this, Connor proposes that ethno/ethnic nationalism is a political tool used to 
obscure intergroup differences and grievances (141) appreciating “the psychological/emotional depth 
of ethnonational identity”. In addition, Wallace (1991) posits the use of shared myths and 
constructions to bridge gaps between slightly distinct groups creating a feeling of mutuality in 
conceiving a nation. Kim Kwang-ok also weighs-in on the role of ethnic nationalism and cultural 
homogeneity discourse as a method of reaching a hybrid between the two disparate cultures of the 
Koreas. Asserting commonality, it allows the two Koreas to dispose of the incompatible features of 
their two systems and keep the best elements (1992: ) As the Koreas have a shared history with 
founding mythology and, although ideologically and culturally they have moved very far apart, have 
advanced this mythology when discussing unification. Ethnic nationalist rhetoric can be used to ignore 
the incompatibilities between the economic, political, and societal models of the totalitarian North 
and the capitalistic South, prioritising ethnic over patriotic forces. This project will not divulge into 
the exact shared mythology of the Koreas but observe the usage of this assumed commonality. 
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However, this conception of national identity construction implies that formation is largely 
voluntary and internally mandated, but Geschiere proposes an alternate, reactive view. The Perils of 
Belonging observes a global phenomenon of autochthony in which, paradoxically, as global forces 
penetrate a state and increase interdependence, at the local level, there is a strong and urgent need for 
localisation and belonging. Although neoliberal norms advocate for a pairing-back of the nation-state 
and democratisation, right-wing populist forces repurpose the nation-state as a reinforcer of 
indigenous identities, excluding “strangers” as he labels them. The author demonstrates this in 
Francophone Africa noting a colonial-born dynamic distinguishing between “people of the land” 
(Geschiere, 2009: 15) and “allogenes”, or strangers typically of the same state (3). This differs from 
the Korean peninsula as it has no “stranger” group to exclude. However, both Koreas have been 
heavily coerced by their more capable allies to behave in certain ways. With a strong and globalised 
economy, perhaps one can interpret unification as a search for “belonging” or promotion of an 
exclusively Korean identity against coercive global forces. However, as unification intersects both 
conservative and liberal administrations, it is questionable if it can be called a right-wing populist force. 
On balance, the interactions between the two Koreas can be most accurately described as a 
combination of Geschiere’s and Connor’s accounts: constructing belonging and exclusivity in an 
internationalised world while using ethnic nationalism to perpetuate a ‘one-ness’ to the Korean people 
while ‘excluding’ their bilateral security relationship with the USA, prioritising blood over strategy. 
The survey work of Shin Gi-Wook following the inter-Korean summit of 2000 inspired this 
project. From surveying members of the Korean public, he concluded that people of the ROK who 
believed in a strong sense of blood and ethnic homogeneity with people of the DPRK had a much 
stronger will to unify (2006: 195). Those same people also overwhelmingly believed that Kim Il-sung 
was the primary reason that the Korean peninsula was divided and that DPRK civilians are victims of 
a communist, totalitarian ideology (197). He concluded in this research that discourse designed to 
promote a belief in ethnic homogeneity and positive attitudes towards unification in general might 
raise the level of tolerance and understanding in the public for when inherent difficulties in unification 
plans arise (198). He interpreted ethnic nationalism as an “invaluable, though insufficient” tool in its 
own merit (187). This considered, this project will see how this tool is used with other ‘tools’ to 
promote a certain type of unification plan that can be perceived as welcomed and viable for both 
domestic and international actors. 
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Although this project focuses on ROK governmental policy, similar ethnic nationalist forces 
must be evident in the DPRK as well. In The Cleanest Race (Myers, 2010), the author reported his 
findings of reading DPRK literature at the Information Center on North Korea and concluded the 
societal structure is based around a pure and innocent image of the Korean people. Nasr, having given 
a comprehensive historical account on ethnic nationalism as resembled in DPRK pieces of literature 
and works released by its leaders shows a progression into identification through bloodlines and 
hostility of foreign influences (2014: 49) prefaced on independent unification with Southern brethren 
(220). This was supported by primary records of Kim Il-sung speeches on unification, noting the 
ethnic nationalist discourse in the examples recorded in For the Independent & Peaceful Reunification of 
Korea (1976). Shin again contributes, collecting commentary on the state of North Korean society and 
its ethnic nationalist nature (2006: 86-95). These pieces show there is indeed a common ground of 
discourse, which both Koreas employ.  
Literature on the Sunshine Policy and rapprochement towards the DPRK has predominantly 
focused on the projects’ effect on inter-Korean relations. Son describes the policy as a three-level 
engagement: a domestic shift in identity, an inter-state change in the status quo, and global integration 
(2006: 45-60). It is helpful to this project due to its comprehensive and far-reaching account of the 
period. It also makes some effort in discussing norms of identity and shifts during this period. 
However, its account of identity is limited to a domestic audience and does not account for additional 
international elements of engagement. Kim Yong-ho delves further in to the nature of the Sunshine 
Policy and its rhetoric. He forwards state survival as the sole reason for the advancement of the Policy, 
and the subsequent acceptance by the DPRK. He recognises the Kim Dae-jung administration wished 
to push a positive identification with the North through this era but is quick to dismiss it. He argues 
the period of the Sunshine Policy was too short for any norms of identity to be internalised by the 
ROK population (2011: 174). However, this account is a victim of its age. Writing in 2011, this is in 
clear reaction to the Lee Myung-bak administration declaring Sunshine a failure (MOU, 2010: 17). 
Considering the most recent rapprochement efforts in 2018, although it was suppressed, themes of 
the Sunshine Policy live on today. This project will not focus on domestic reinterpretation of the 
DPRK, but internationally-focused speech acts avoiding Kim’s critique. 
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b. Theoretical Literature 
This project will presume that nationhood is a social construct and will explain the applicability 
of social constructivism. Wendt showed identities are not carried by actors independent of the wider 
social context, rather “[actors] define their interests in the process of defining their situations” (1992: 
398). Statements made by these political institutions would constitute, as Foucault accounts, serious 
speech acts, designed to be internalised, repeated, and disseminated amongst the audience (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow 1982: 48-49). In discussing and contextualising unification, the ROK government defines 
how the peninsula, their foreign policy interests vis-à-vis the DPRK moving forward, and their 
relationship with the DPRK regime. Son offers insight into the constructivist account of transnational 
integration and identities. He posits that the North must be reinvented as an ally as engagement is 
impossible with an enemy state (2006: 51), Moreover, interactions with the outside world, and 
especially with the ROK, would mean a shift towards interdependence and an adoption of a pan-
Korean identity (2004: 95). According to Wendt (1999: 344), interdependence is a fundamental 
variable to adopting a collective identity. Thus, the ROK disseminates serious speech acts on its 
interpretation of the DPRK in relation to itself through unification discussion. 
Ancillary to social constructivism, the application of ethnic nationalism requires an 
understanding of “securitisation” theory. Securitisation sees security as predominantly state-produced 
speech-acts (Wæver, 1995: 55). In security, there are certain issues which the state reserves an absolute 
right to take “extraordinary measures” on which it can give “supreme priority” (Buzan, Wæver & de 
Wilde, 1998: 26) to, beyond the standard rule sets expected of a state. To securitise an issue, the issue 
must be an existential threat, require emergency action, and have an “effect on inter-unit relations by 
breaking free of rules” (ibid). Wæver suggests the first requirement does not need to be related to 
harm or damage necessarily, but anything that may undercut sovereignty and prevent politics from 
operating as autonomously as it should (1995: 51-2). Balzacq (2005) expands this theory by adding in 
further variables for effective securitisation: the surrounding context, the psycho-cultural disposition 
of the audience (172), and the degree of power held by the agent making the securitisation speech act 
(179). Moreover, the agent will use “various artifacts (metaphors, emotions, stereotypes, gestures, 
silence, and even lies)” to advance its agenda to the audience (172). It becomes clear the ROK could 
promote the standoff between the two Koreas to an existential threat through speech acts and 
unification publications to an audience with a very stringent agenda to maintain status quo (the US 
military forces).   
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3. Methodology 
a. The Constructs for Observation 
The observed constructs are the English-translated White Papers published by the MOU, 
available online. Three reasons explain the decision to limit the research to the English-published 
White Papers. Firstly, these White Papers represent a collection of speeches, policy decisions, research 
brought together from the contemporary administration condensed into a report format. It is logical 
to conclude the White Papers accurately represent the viewpoints of that administration 
comprehensively and fully. Secondly, the author is not sufficiently confident in their understanding of 
Korean for all annually published White Papers. Most importantly, the MOU translating these White 
Papers to English suggests a desire to make them accessible to an international audience, meaning 
there are stronger implications for international relations. Chilton observes political discourse carries 
with it a “charge” of legitimisation and cooperation (2004: 201-205). By publishing these White Papers 
in English at these certain points in time, the MOU is reaffirming its stance as legitimate actor and 
representative for the ROK government on all matters pertaining to unification. Due to this, the White 
Papers act as a signal to the international community for how the ROK government wishes to promote 
itself in the region, views the current geopolitical environment, sets goals, and what means it will use 
to achieve them. 
b. Methodology in Approaching the Constructs 
This project will assess the qualitative nature of statements in the White Papers considering 
the potential implications. The author will make observations on the content, format, and themes 
present in each document. Most pertinent to the project will be what discourse on ethnic nationalism 
combines with what other themes to elucidate how the ROK administrations viewed their brethren 
in the North, their own international position, and the future of the Korean nation. Through observing 
and analysing themes that appear in the White Paper, this project hopes to shed further light on the 
states of Korean unification discourse, and the intentions behind it. Substantive literature on the 
causes and historical context for these changes in discourse will be discussed later in the paper, now 
the primary focus is on illustrating the powerful influence of identities and application of ethnic 
nationalism.  
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In addition to this, a quantitative analysis on selected keywords will be used to account for 
transitions and prominence of themes before, during and after the Sunshine period. As noted by 
Chilton (2004: 9), the use of certain terminology and phrases indicate micro-intentions of a larger 
system and preference over other potential outcomes. Still, the number of key word appearances will 
be cited to punctuate and compliment qualitative findings.  
For this project, the open source software Yoshikoder was used. It allows for a full-text search 
of selected key words from a .txt file and lists them in a concordance with five words surrounding it 
to understand context. The text was copied to Notepad and then read through to ensure formatting 
remained consistent with the original. The author used the latent coding method detailed in Neuman 
(2013: 375-379) and was the only coder, eliminating the need to consider between-coder 
disagreements. Once the word count was established, the author made a concordance of all key words 
that appeared in the document, including five words before and after the key word to understand the 
context the word was used in. The author would then subtract uses of the words that were irrelevant 
to the themes being investigated, personally judging its relevancy. For an example of irrelevant key 
word usage, in using the word “united”, the phrase “united Korea” is substantially different than 
“United Nations”; the former suggests a single Korean nation state. Headers, footers, and proper 
nouns were subtracted from the final word count as the author found they did not contribute to the 
elaboration of the themes in question. Another example would be the difference between “national 
community”, implying a consistent linkage between all Koreans across the DMZ, and the 
“international community” which is indicative of a multilateral, global structure. By finding the most 
mentioned key words, the theme and intentions the MOU wished to convey can become apparent.  
For this project, the coding decisions will help produce a vivid picture of how concepts are 
utilised and accentuate the analysis of trends across the various White Papers. However, to maintain 
impartiality, the manifest coding results (raw, as-is) will be included in Appendix C. 
In addition to these word groups, the author also found the most commonly used independent 
words, as this helped find themes or catchphrases these publications promoted. These key words were 
acquired through a preliminary reading of the documents. The list was regularly updated to 
accommodate new words, phrases and themes that were unseen from other documents. 
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c. Coding Table 
Word group Key words 
Activism dictator*, dignity, free*, human rights, libert*, rights, violat* 
Nationalism Korean people, brethren, common*, communit*, consensus, divi*, 
homogen*, identity, nation* 
Security against the North aggressi*, conflict, confront*, nuclear, secur*, provoc* 
Prosperity co-prosper*, develop*, econom*, growth, prosper* 
 
Note: the asterisk (*) represents any possible value to account for plurals and alternative forms of the base word. 
d. Limitations 
There were limitations to this approach, however. The key words chosen for a single category 
sometimes appeared together in the same sentence and checking for these repetitions proved to be 
difficult as the concordances were ordered by key word rather than by chronological order of 
appearance, thus the author chose to include them into the final count. Also, the conversion of the 
2001 White Paper was problematic due to it being a scanned document which made text copying 
difficult. Several words were converted into random characters that could not be detected by the 
software, so the final numerical results may not be entirely accurate. As the author decided key words’ 
relevance. this may not reflect additional opinions and the robustness of the quantitative conclusions 
may be limited, but these conclusions are complemented by the additional textual analysis. Moreover, 
the data was collected over a period of one month and although the author tried to maintain standard 
rules for selection, there may be some human error in the results. Regardless, the author feels the 
results of the quantitative analyses are consistent with the qualitative findings. 
This project is limited to the content of the White Papers and is not a comprehensive analysis 
of the causes behind numerous unification strategies. Therefore, ethnic nationalism cannot fully 
explain the founding the GIC and GTR, for example. However, the discourse in the White Papers 
plays a vital role in representation and the ROK’s approach to the outside world. The author was led 
by the content of the White Papers and finding explanations rather than the inverse. 
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e. Preliminary Hypothesis 
This section will propose hypotheses for the questions related to this project. For the question 
of consistently pushing for unification, the author believes unification diplomacy is beyond that of 
mere coexistence with an authoritarian “other” or a reduction of hostilities to secure the peninsula, it 
is a projection of self-interest and norms the ROK administration want to disseminate.  This larger 
agenda may include greater autonomy in foreign policy and diplomacy, more influence in the security 
alliance with the United States, what economic route should be taken to develop the DPRK.  
Regarding the question of ethnic nationalism, the author hypothesises it is an integral part of 
the ROK’s securitisation strategy. A unique feature of the Korean nation is its clear division in an 
ongoing, yet largely frozen, conflict. In this sense, division is difficult to grasp, unclear, yet malleable. 
This author hypothesises that proponents of the Sunshine Policy used the metaphors described by 
Balzacq (2005: 172) such as vague concepts of national pain and division to its advantage, as part of a 
larger toolset to achieve the state’s aims. This is not to say it causes a change in circumstances but is 
mobilised at times which the state aims to change the status quo. The author hypothesises progressive 
administrations chose to make the standoff an immediate existential threat to the entire Korean nation, 
securitising it. By tying objectives with ethnic nationalist discourse, the White Paper securitises the 
objective with an exclusivity that is beyond public debate (Huysmans, 1998).  
The scope of this project spans five separate administrations, wrestling dominance between 
the Democratic Party (the Liberals) and the Grand National Party (Conservatives). Seeing as the 
Liberals pioneered the Sunshine Policy, it would serve their interests to incorporate greater emphasis 
on ethnic nationalism. This author hypothesises the nationalism key word group will be the most 
prevalent in 2001 and 2005 White Papers.  
Conversely, with an anti-communist bend, and a reputation of maintaining strong relations 
with the United States, it would make sense for the Conservative administrations to minimise 
suggestions of brotherhood, or one nation state with the North, or even entertain unification 
diplomacy. The author hypothesises the three administrations will reinforce the importance of the 
strategic partnership with the United States. Therefore, these Papers should feature methods to 
redefine the meaning or goals behind unification, incorporating rhetoric that will portray unification 
as an extremely long-term project. 
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4. Analysis 
a. White Paper 1996 
i. Historical context 
In 1992, it became clear the DPRK was developing a nuclear weapons programme using the 
Yongbyon reactor, a domestic source of natural uranium, and technology developed by ethnic Korean 
scientists in Japan (Oberdorfer, 2014: 195-198). Although it joined the NPT, it was unclear how much 
weight it gave to the obligations (198). Soon after, both Koreas had signed the first non-aggression 
and recognition pact in December 1991 (204). Following, US officials met with their DPRK 
counterparts and agreed to an IAEA inspection regime (208), but this agreement quickly fell through 
once the ROK pushed for a continuation of joint military exercises (217). The DPRK then declared 
its intention to withdraw from the NPT (218).  
 In 1993, both the US and ROK administrations changed to Democrat Incumbent President 
Clinton and the New Korea Party Incumbent President Kim Young-sam. The crisis continued 
through to 1994 (219-256), an uncertain period between diplomatic engagements, and proposed 
sanctions against Pyongyang, during its fourth year of decline (232-3). This cycle changed with Kim 
Il-sung’s death in 1994 and the quick succession of his son, Kim Jong-il. There followed rapid progress 
in a deal for proliferation-proof LWRs and 500,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil in exchange for the DPRK 
to suspend its nuclear activities and return to the NPT (279-80): the Agreed Framework. However, 
tensions soon returned when KEDO designed to fund the LWRs stalled over the details of the 
reactors themselves (286). The 1996 White Paper was drafted with these events in recent memory. 
The MOU published the 1996 White Paper in December, three years into President Kim 
Young-sam’s term. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unification, Kwon O-kie, wrote 
the preface and used the unification of both Germany and Yemen as examples to show the Cold War 
has ended, and the world has moved on. He contrasts this with the Korean peninsula, demonstrating 
the need for it to “be carried out in the present reality” (MOU, 1996: v). Most importantly, though, is 
the emphasis on the independent, and bilateral nature this unification must take (vi). This analysis serves 
as a preliminary view into the conditions of ROK unification policy just before the beginning of the 
Sunshine Policy. The depiction of the peninsula and the Korean race will be analysed and discussed. 
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ii. Koreans as one people 
Much of the content and rhetoric concentrated on reinforcing the idea that Koreans on either 
side of the DMZ are one people. Consistently, the document returns to discourse on restoring 
“cultural homogeneity” and creating a “national community”. Terms of this nature occurred 167 times 
in the document, far above any other group. The fact it uses these words with such fervour and 
prominence shows efforts to promote ethnic relations between Koreans remains high on the priority 
list for the administration. Moreover, the adverse factor negatively affecting unification progress is 
purportedly intensified heterogeneity (172-173). Citing Germany and its own problems with internal 
integration after the collapse of the Berlin Wall shows that even success stories struggle decades later. 
Although it hopes to learn from these difficulties, it puts the creation of a national community ahead 
of overcoming heterogeneity and prioritises ethnic solidarity over patriotism to the ROK.  
iii. Sacrifices for brethren 
The document acknowledges and indeed reminds the reader of the sacrifices needed and 
economic burden placed on “all Koreans” for unification to take place. Despite this frank estimation 
of “pain and sacrifice of the present generation” (179), the Paper pushes the narrative that the 
sacrifices are outweighed by the benefits. Moreover, the Paper employs an anti-communist narrative 
to explain the shortage of food in the North, claiming Soviet-style collectivisation of farmland led to 
inefficiencies in production (63). The Paper perceives of food donations as a method for dispelling 
mistrust and building confidence between the two (164). 
iv. Korea as an international power 
The document proposes a grand scheme of Korea as an international economic power. 
Complementing President Kim’s drive for globalisation, this document conceives of a united Korean 
peninsula as a capable competitor in Northeast Asia. The prospect of a rapidly developing Korean 
peninsula takes up much of the seventh chapter on the future. It uses the success of the ROK 
democratisation and economic liberalisation to argue a similar model can help improve the “welfare 
of all Korean people” (138-141). Faced with this success, DPRK economy liberalisation is allegedly 
inevitable (172) and that norms of respect for liberty and human rights will be institutionalised upon 
unifying; although it does not explicitly say that the ROK will lead this effort. Combined with the 
broken Cold War regional balance, the White Paper presses urgency in the economic development 
and industrialisation of the Korean peninsula to remain relevant amongst superpowers (175). This is 
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consistent with President Kim’s 1994 Liberation Day speech expressing hope for gradual unification 
but that it may be possible to “occur unexpectedly at any time” (National Unification Board ROK, 
1994: 10). As a region in transition, the Paper pushes a narrative of fear towards the neighbouring 
powers, suggesting their influence over the peninsula will stymy unification (MOU, 1996: 175), both 
Koreas must “establish the role and status of the Korean peninsula” (ibid). These plans have 
considerable urgency, not what the author expected of a conservative government. Thus, the White 
Paper wants to guarantee the promotion of a free market to improve the international prowess of 
Korea. 
On the other hand, the document does not mention economics as often as security; the 
prosperity key word group only appeared 80 times compared to 99 times for the security group. 
Although, it is not a considerable difference between the two. This suggests while it is not the first 
priority, it is still an integral part of the administration’s unification policy, and spillover from its 
worldview. This project will consider this worldview later.  
v. Korea as a single, independent and developed state 
Combined with the efforts for increased global presence is the emphasis on a developed 
“national community”. The term “intra-Korean” is weaved through all topics, implying there is a single 
nation-state of Korea, rather than two independent states as “inter-Korean” would suggest. This is 
important for the internal economic environment, as the Paper wishes to incorporate stronger focus 
of travel and business enterprises over the DMZ to advance the welfare of “the entire Korean people” 
(141). To promote this, the Paper proposed that intra-Korean transactions carry no taxes or tariffs 
considering them domestic transaction (142). This has huge implications for how the administration 
views the DPRK, and suggests it is already well under way in considering it part of a single state. 
Disregarding the word “unification”, “intra-Korean” was the most prominent phrase in the 
document, with 153 mentions. This shows the norm of interpreting unification as a single state is the 
most important take-away from this Paper. The Paper defines the unification heavily on its 
independence, implying autonomy from other coercing powers which is like the platform taken by 
Kim Il-sung (1974: 37-38). In this regard, the two Koreas have peddled very similar discourse. 
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vi. Unification as a synthesis of two 
The act of unification is left as an exercise to be determined between the two Koreas, rather 
than imposing the approach of one onto the other nor consulting other powers over the preferred 
approach. Near the beginning, the White Paper rejects an ROK-led, or military-backed push for 
unification. Additionally, the Paper rejects an interim agreement of a Korean Commonwealth, under 
a ‘one country, two systems’ approach à la Hong Kong and China, calling it “impossible” (MOU, 
1996: 78). Rather, it wishes to take ‘best’ parts of both approaches and incorporate them together. 
Most notably, though, is that the Paper does not seek the help of the United States in this matter 
exclusively, rather it seeks help from the entire international community. Because a synthesis of a 
‘communist’ system with a neoliberal democracy would be highly undesirable to the security interests 
of the US, the significance of this will be brought up again later.  
vii. Unification as the will of the people 
To support the heady claims and plans made in this document, the Paper tactically linked this 
desire for unification as an expression of will from the people of the ROK. It uses census data gathered 
by the Research Institute for National Unification to show that 84.4% of the public are in favour of 
unification with the DPRK (178). This use of survey figures is used to forward an impression of 
democratic mandate in the policies this Paper advocates for. In the 1994 Liberation Day speech 
President Kim describes the Korean War as a loss of Korea’s independence and division between East 
and West (National Unification Board ROK, 1994: 13) and that unification should be decided 
exclusively by the Korean people and national consensus (15). Again, the status quo is viewed as 
unsatisfactory due to the lack of independence, and this survey data gives this view legitimacy. 
viii. Security concerns 
The Paper makes it clear that rapprochement should be based on clear potential for securing 
and de-escalating the peninsula. Quoting the President, only if there is a possibility that the DPRK 
would stop developing nuclear weapons would he endeavour to meet Kim Il-sung. In hindsight, a 
summit with the DPRK would be pivotal for any attempts at unification and rapprochement, as can 
be seen with the 2000 and 2005 Inter-Korean summits yet prefaces this on nuclear talks first. 
Additionally, the Paper mentions that the nuclear solution is the priority when interacting (MOU, 
1996: 109). Yet very little is dedicated to discussing how denuclearisation can be achieved, aside from 
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offers for LWRs. Then, it wished to focus on the international dimension of it, utilising KEDO (124-
125).  
Although “nuclear”, both energy and weapons, only appears 53 times in total, the text gave 
significant gravity to nuclear proliferation and the security keyword group was the second most 
prominent group after nationalism.  This shows its pivotal nature to inter-Korean dialogue.  
b. White Paper 2001 
i. Historical context 
The rapprochement efforts advertised by President Kim Dae-jung began in earnest with “cattle 
diplomacy”, whereby Chung Ju-yung, founder of Hyundai and born in Northern Korea, brought 500 
cattle to the North followed by another 501. (Oberdorfer, 2014: 325) This granted Hyundai the right 
to develop Mt. Geumgang for an inter-Korean tourist project. However, this private initiative soon 
changed to a public partnership, having the ROK government bailing them out.  
This period was not without confrontations. In summer 1999, a series of conflicts broke out in 
the Yellow Sea due to Northern fishers in Southern waters (Michishita, 2010: 145-148). The most 
important event of this period and most relevant to the White Paper would be the inter-Korean 
summit of 2000. Following this was Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok’s visit to Washington, DC, 
complemented by the US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, visit to Pyongyang (Oberdorfer, 2014: 
341-344). With travel between the respective governments at an all-time high, it appeared there was a 
cemented atmosphere for rapprochement and reconciliation. Unfortunately, it did not last as President 
George Bush succeeded President Clinton in early 2001. The MOU published the White Paper during 
the nascent stage of President Bush’s term and with no indications that the US would reverse all 
progress made from these numerous summits and negotiations.  
Moreover, President Kim Dae-jung had returned from the 2000 Inter-Korean summit in June. 
Like 1996, it still places a strong emphasis on ethnic nationalism and seeks improved welfare of all 70 
million people to “restore national hegemony’’ (MOU, 2001: 26) to ‘’soar up to be the world’s greatest 
nation’’ (35). However, this romantic discourse is loaded at the front of the document, in the 
Promotion of the Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy chapter, rather than interwoven throughout. 
There is an exception to this, however, which will be discussed further down. From even the preface 
onwards, it becomes apparent that it emphasises the need for reconciliation and cooperation first. 
Rather than framing the creation of a national community or a single Korean state as an immediate 
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concern, it prioritises transitional justice and inter-Korean collaboration before such an objective can 
be achieved. Thus, the tone has much less urgency compared to 1996, a more gradual unification. 
ii. Economic nationalism and welfare 
Most striking is the combination of economics with nationalist discourse. It consistently 
mentions a need for “balanced development” across the Korean peninsula, rather than concentrated 
in the South and improving welfare for all Koreans. The language used around economics is very 
similar to 1996, an unexpected feature considering the political rivalry between Kim Dae-jung and 
Kim Young-sam. The phrases “welfare of all Korean people” and “national economic community” 
appear regularly, which could be interpreted as advocating economic nationalism which will be 
discussed later.  
Following a policy of “easy matters first” (62), the White Paper makes it clear that the ROK 
will court the DPRK in becoming economically interlinked with the globalised world (93) and 
developing the entire peninsula to serve as a land bridge between it, China and Russia. Normally this 
would be part of an ambitious construction project, but the White Paper tries to tie its completion to 
unification. It claims the reconnection of the North-South Gyeongui line will represent an overcoming 
of national division and “reconnect the main artery of the Korean people” (90). This is not followed 
by a concrete account on how this will increase inter-Korean travel or how the ROK will push for less 
restrictions on freedom of movement in the DPRK but its mere existence is supposedly monumental. 
This is consistent with the June 15th Joint Declaration that, while agreeing on independent unification, 
welcomed international cooperation and integration (MOU, 2000: 12). Overall, the White Paper is 
placing the exchange of economic supplies and regional integration as a fundamental landmark in 
unification. 
Most noticeably, the prosperity key word group has become twice more prevalent since 1996, 
from 80 to 153. The author identified 25 sentences that linked prosperity as fundamental to national 
unification and recovery of national capacity. This suggests the focus of this document is based on 
economic cooperation with the DPRK for the mutual benefit of both parties. Moreover, this sends 
an important message to the reader that the ROK will use economic growth and cooperation as a 
means for unification. 
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iii. Forgiveness and trust-building as a primary goal 
The nationalist discourse often combines with forgiveness and reconciliation. Quoting the 
President, unification must end “mistrust and enmity” to reunify “the motherland” (MOU, 2001: 34). 
Another example would be the constant reference to “mutual trust and national homogeneity” (37 & 
41). This shows the authors interpret the issue of unification differently from their predecessors: there 
are hurdles that the two Koreas must resolve first in mutual coordination. 
Security talks were a “dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula” (58) to 
create a “durable and stable peace” (77). At one point the document quotes President Kim Dae-jung 
in an interview in which he conceives of the Korean War as a humanitarian crisis, and one that is the 
most urgent to solve (165). The White Paper interprets this conflict and mentality to intersect all 
elements of inter-Korean relations, including worker relations, claiming a lack of coordination was 
due to differences in ideology and values (173).   
iv. Korea as two states for now 
The interpretation of Korea has radically changed in this document. All mentions of “intra-
Korean” were removed from this document. While this may seem innocuous at first, it completely 
changes the policy the administration would take under President Kim Dae-jung. Rather than seeing 
unification as the priority and ‘muddling through’ the difficulties inherent in that approach, this Paper 
makes it clear in acknowledging two legitimate Koreas for the foreseeable future and building trust 
between each other first. The document also becomes more specific in what projects the two Koreas 
should undertake before talking of themselves as “one”. Kim Dae-jung’s approach to economic 
integration is more measured and detailed. The document proposes the GIC and GTR, along with 
humanitarian aid to bring Koreans in the North up to a similar standard of the ROK. “Cooperation” 
was used 391 times in the document and “inter-Korean” 388 times, the two most prevalent words 
behind North and South. Because of this prevalence, the reader receives the distinct impression that 
the DPRK is a business partner and stakeholder in the unification process, which was less obvious 
before. 
v. Humanitarian crises expanded 
This document emphasises the famine and the war threat as humanitarian crises but also raises 
defectors and the human rights situation in the DPRK, however it dismisses them as irrelevant to the 
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immediate future of inter-Korean relations, even damaging to conducive dialogue (165). For defectors, 
the document details the resettlement programme but acknowledges most defections as due to the 
food and economic situation (155), rather than escaping political repression. It dedicates most of the 
content to the challenges faced by the defectors on the way to the South Korean embassy in Beijing, 
choosing not to disclose an opinion on the conditions in the DPRK (157).  
For human rights, the Paper summarises the findings of NGOs and intergovernmental 
organisations while once again remaining silent on governmental policy around human rights moving 
forward, acting as a mere messenger. The only response to these allegations is that the government is 
cataloguing the violations and recommendations from the international community for later 
consideration (166) but are very frank in that they will not take any action. Although the prevalence 
of the activist key word group only slightly reduced, they were used in a dismissive tone. Still, it is 
important to note the White Paper acknowledges the humanitarian issue as needing attention in 
discussion about unification. 
c. White Paper 2005 
i. Historical context 
The 2005 White Paper released a few years after a tumultuous time in international relations, 
especially as an ally to the United States: the collapse of the Agreed Framework years into the Bush 
administration (Oberdorfer, 2014: 354 & 363), 9/11, the war in Afghanistan, the axis of evil speech 
following the 2003 Iraq invasion. All these events had an impact on the framing and the focus of the 
2005 White Paper as a document. Possibly the most pivotal event, however, would be in 2003 where 
the DPRK refuelled the smaller Yongbyon reactor, effectively restarting its nuclear weapons 
programme (383).  
Unlike previous editions, this has no preface and instead opts for a chapter on progress made 
so far under previous administrations and tellingly has a section dedicated to the Sunshine Policy. This 
recap has made similar observations to this project, stating the Kim Dae-jung administration saw the 
DPRK “as a partner for seeking coexistence and co-prosperity...instead of hastily seeking a de jure 
unification” (MOU, 2005: 14).  
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ii. Instability as a threat to the Korean nation 
From the beginning, it becomes clear the Paper prioritises reducing military tensions and 
denuclearisation, referred to as a “peace regime” (15). Clearly the most pressing concern is the nuclear 
threat, as they put that as the starting point for security discussions (17). It recognises that any 
destabilisation or “any form of war that could destroy the Korean nation must be avoided” (ibid).  
However, they reported the Koreas made progress reducing tensions along the West Sea and have 
placed it on the agenda for the 13th and 14th inter-Korean dialogues (29-36). In other sections, the 
principle of peace seeps into progress reports. For example, on humanitarian aid contributions, the 
Paper states that shipments of rice and food help ease military tensions without disclosing exactly how 
or why that would be the case (72). Further, the GIC was reported to help bring “stability and peace... 
as well as resolving the North Korean nuclear issue” (75). It wishes to promote military security and 
resolving the unstable situation on the peninsula as the primary goal for their unification policy, yet 
the total number of mentions regarding security stayed around the same (at 47). The reader deduces 
that the MOU are reluctant to delve too deeply into why the security environment is unstable and how 
it can be resolved. 
The document paints the KEDO Light Water Reactor initiative in an extremely favourable 
and optimistic light. In Chapter 5, it recaps how far the project has come and how much money each 
country has contributed in making it a reality. This Paper comes three years since the DPRK disclosed 
their HEU uranium programme and two years since the KEDO project was suspended in December 
1st, 2003 (118) but calls this suspension “temporary”. By describing this project as only temporarily 
suspended, it shows the government wishes to press for the resumption.  
iii. Regionalist economics 
The Paper is consistent with 2001 with its depiction of the Korean peninsula as a “hub” for 
trade and manufacturing, putting the GIC as the centre. Their approach to this is by introducing the 
DPRK into regional initiatives and economic blocs such as ASEAN+3 and the Regional Forum (16-
9 & 49). Much of the third chapter is devoted to data on inter-Korean trade but is then followed by 
pushing the need for reconnecting roads and railways between the two (39). It views this as an 
important step to creating a larger economic bloc. On page 67, it shows an image of a connected 
Trans-Siberian Railway and the Trans-Chinese Railroad terminating at Gaesong, referring to it as the 
“Iron Silk Road” (68).  
21 
S2068419 
Interestingly, the discourse on developing and improving the welfare of Korean people 
through economics has completely disappeared in this Paper. Now, economics is used as a method 
for regional integration and repositioning Korea as a land bridge “between the continental and oceanic 
economies” (17). The nationalism key word group only appears 33 times, a precipitous drop from the 
previous two Papers. It is important to ask why this nationalist discourse is not being used any more 
– has the objective been achieved? It would certainly appear not. 
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iv. The DPRK as a reliable, almost blameless partner 
The Paper is reticent towards addressing genuine issues of the DPRK. When reviewing the 
progress made on separated families and reunions, the evaluation of how the DPRK dealt with this 
issue is light. Discussing the DPRK refusing to facilitate further family reunions, the Paper refers to it 
as due to a “cooling down of inter-Korean relations” (98) implying they both were at fault in its failure. 
The worst assessment they voice is the DPRK was “passive” (21).  Combining with this is the 
reaffirmation that the DPRK is grateful for humanitarian contributions (106). All this together gives 
the impression that the ROK is aiming to portray the DPRK as a reliable partner in unification, and 
that the issues encountered in the relationship have, in some way, a linkage back to the ROK as well. 
For the audience, this depiction makes it appear the DPRK is ready for introduction back into the 
international system and trustworthy. 
Regarding North Korean “refugees” and the human rights situation, these issues are not 
treated in a comprehensive manner. On refugees, rather than report on reasons for why they defected 
to the ROK in the first place, they refuse to apply a critical judgment and more as a simple fact, 
describing it as “the touchstone in establishing an inter-Korean community” (107). This changes their 
image from victims of an oppressive regime, to a prime example of how free movement between the 
two Koreas should operate which is both bizarre and interesting. For the human rights issue, it limits 
the discussion to just two pages passing little judgment on the current situation but reaffirms the 
ROK’s commitment to human rights. Commenting on the human rights situation, the Paper removes 
the ROK’s assessment entirely by stating “the international community considers North Korea’s 
human rights record to be poor” (111). On the UN Human Rights Council Resolution in 2004 
condemning the DPRK human rights situation, the authors justified the ROK’s abstention by 
suggesting it would be better to “approach the issue in a prudent manner” and that the DPRK is not 
entirely to blame due to its “unique situation” (111). Finally, addressing the US Congress Bill on human 
rights, it effectively calls the Bill an unrealistic approach to helping the situation (112). Activism is 
down from 2001, showing up only twice. Reading this document shows the MOU are reluctant and 
trying desperately to keep the DPRK in as positive of a light as possible for the readers. 
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d. Transitions into Sunshine 
Now the author will recount the changes seen between the White Papers and discuss reasons 
for these transitions. The aim of this exercise is to see how the use of nationalist discourse changed 
over time, what purpose this discourse served, and additional comments on changing approaches to 
unification over time. 
i. Korea – From one state soon, to two for now 
Initially the Korean peninsula was portrayed as tragically and artificially divided between a 
single people. The 1996 White Paper alluded to urgent unification for all Koreans to gain advantage 
of the globalisation drives of the Kim Young-sam administration. It recognised the obstacles inherent 
in this sudden push for unification but conceived of them as less important than the gains made from 
becoming a single nation state again. It heavily focused on the ideas of cultural, linguistic, and ethnic 
homogeneity to affirm this need for an urgent unification.  
 Then, the discourse of 2001 put urgent unification off the agenda, and instead focused on 
overcoming mistrust and past misgivings between the two Koreas first. It proposed inter-Korean 
collaborations on several fronts to achieve this goal. Despite this, the nationalist discourse employed 
previously remains strong in this document as well but entertains concrete ideas on how this can be 
best achieved. The Paper repurposed ethnic nationalist discourse for cooperation, rather than 
unification purely in itself. 
By 2005, the norm of two Koreas as functional partners had become internalised to the point 
where the idea of a single state Korea was not discussed. The nationalistic and romantic discourse of 
2001 and 1996 largely subsided, but several mentions were made to the idea of free movement and 
creating an inter-Korean national community through travel between the two Koreas. 
Initially, it is perplexing to see the Kim Young-sam administration express an urgent need to 
create a single state, and frame discussion in the White Paper around this state. President Kim failed 
to enact any policies that would create such a single nation state and restore homogeneity. Although 
he was a democracy activist during the military dictatorship, he had no legacy of pro-North tendencies 
and reportedly shared anti-communist thoughts with former US President Jimmy Carter, disclosing 
the North’s human rights abuses (Creekmore, 2006: 117). Yet this discussion of human rights abuses 
is only subtly hinted at in the document. 
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 This author submits pushes for swift unification were due to a brief deterioration of relations 
with the United States. The inclusion of ethnic nationalism in this Paper could be due to the Kim 
Young-sam administration expressing a desire to independently engage with Pyongyang, showing 
frustration at American-led initiatives.  
Observing the context of the ROK-US alliance may help explain the discourse in the 1996 
White Paper. Kim Young-sam was a political rival to Kim Dae-jung. He would reportedly quote public 
opinion figures showing the desire for urgent reconciliation and creating allyship with “national kin’’ 
(Oberdorfer, 2014: 225). Kim Sung-han suggests the ROK and USA were in a “race” to reach a 
summit with the DPRK. The ROK wished to avoid a triangular relationship with the US and have 
inter-Korean relations dictated on their terms (2005: 182-183). President Kim saw bilateral deals 
between Washington and Pyongyang as a way to prop up the regime doomed to collapse (Yang, 2016: 
17). Cha conceives of this competition and minor rivalry between the ROK and US to attribution 
error whereby the smaller ally either feels abandoned from its concerns or is placated simply to achieve 
the goals of the bigger ally (2005: 124-125). This recorded frustration continued when former 
President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang to talk informally with Kim Il-sung. The Far Eastern 
Economic Review interviewed chief negotiator of Seoul, Lee Dong-bok for a comment, saying “[Carter] 
may be an honest broker, but he is certainly not a knowledgeable broker’’ (Shim J. H. 1994), 
implying this informal visit was inappropriate to move dialogue along and that the ROK should be 
formally negotiating instead. Although President Kim welcomed US initiatives with the DPRK, “he 
held the ultimate position of command” (Creekmore, 2006: 116). When the US proposed suspending 
military exercises to the DPRK, President Kim met with President Clinton in November 15th, making 
it clear that it would be Seoul, not Washington, to decide if military exercises would continue. With 
evidence of strain between the two parties, the use of ethnic nationalism becomes a push for further 
autonomy in foreign affairs. Taken together, the White Paper was an outlet for this expression, an 
indicator of how urgent it sees its involvement as the primary actor in these discussions. The 
prominent use of ethnic nationalism suggests that “we know best” as national kin and perhaps even 
as a warning, accelerating the synthesis of the two Koreas should the US continue to deal with the 
DPRK without including Seoul.  
Applying Connor (1994), the White Paper blurred ideological and cultural distinctions between 
the Koreas, showing commonality outweighed difference, thus making the ROK much more suited 
for discussions with the DPRK. Moreover, it represents unification as an urgent and spontaneous 
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desire. While it is not possible to say whether this discourse influenced changing US strategy towards 
DPRK engagement, ethnic nationalism was a consequence of being left out of this initiative.  
ii. Korea – From international competitor, to regional hub 
For economics and global position, the 1996 White Paper made it clear the Korean peninsula 
should develop a strong domestic economy and production base to compete with the rising influence 
of China, and the dominance of Japan. Conjuring dramatic and strong expressions of improving the 
welfare of all Korean people, its depiction of a united Korea was highly based in economic power. 
White Paper 2001 redefined this focus to operate inside, and with, Northeast Asia. It promoted Korea 
as a manufacturing hub for the rest of the region, all while using its own technologies and human 
capital rather relying on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) from other countries. Instead of competing 
against neighbouring powers, it sought to become self-reliant and an effective partner. This was 
reaffirmed in 2005. 
This is a reaction to the Asian Financial Crisis. Much work has been written on segyehwa 
(globalisation) and the “paradoxical” marriage of nationalism with globalisation (John, 2015: 41). Kim 
J. (2012) notes that globalisation and development (seonjinguk) was a bipartisan policy advocated by 
even progressive leaders (86). Under Kim Young-sam, the ROK underwent economic reform to 
reduce reliance on Japanese and American technologies (Lee Y-I. & Lee K. T. 2015: 131), while still 
prioritising foreign-oriented growth through exports. The ROK was unique in its relationship between 
private enterprises and the government. The government effectively managed conglomerates known 
as chaebols. Through preferential loans, the state would guide where and how chaebols invested in 
commercial projects (D’Costa, 2012). These projects were financed through foreign credit loans rather 
than inward FDI for the state to have full autonomy over business decisions (126). Therefore, Kim J. 
was correct in noting the ROK’s willingness to accede to the neoliberal global order (2012: 83) but 
did so in a corporatist and top-down fashion to keep the nature of development securitised by the 
state. You-il Lee and Kyung Tae Lee (2015: 125-151) recount these years prior to the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis were strongly economically nationalist.  
Several authors have defined and shaped the term “economic nationalism”. Rawi Abdelal 
defines it as “a set of policies that result from a shared national identity or from the predominance of 
a specific nationalism in the politics of a state” (2001: 33). Dent emphasises its capacity to damage 
competing interests, in that economic nationalism “seek[s] to advance the nation’s international 
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position at the potential expense of foreign national or international interests” (2000: 282). This calls 
back to Geschiere’s (2009) observation of using populism to reinforce and amplify “belonging” against 
others, in this case potential competitors, expressed through economic nationalism. Regardless, 
economic nationalism requires a state actor to make economic development of the “nation” a matter 
of policy and oversees the direction in which it takes. Returning to the pre-1997 Financial Crisis, 
Hahmn (2003) notes these chaebol projects often yielded little profit and instilled a moral hazard that 
the chaebols were “too big to fail” (95). When the crisis struck, the IMF required the ROK to open up 
to neoliberal reforms and accept inward FDIs. Kim Dae-jung complied and introduced the “five plus 
three” principles to bring transparency to chaebol affairs and create a “new, democratic market 
economy” (Kim B-K. 2003: 53). He used inward FDI to reform Korea as a global manufacturing hub 
(Lee Y-I. & Lee K. T. 2015: 133) for the global economy, integrating rather than competing.  
The state-chaebol relationship remained but was utilised for means that are more political. 
Hyundai’s split from the Asan Group to receive funding for the GIC and later the GTR. This formed 
part of the 2001 plan to push for more regionalist efforts (47) rather than promoting Korea as an 
economic leader. Applying this context to the White Paper, the consistent raising of economics with 
the equal development of the Korean peninsula fits well with the aims to transform Korea into a 
manufacturing hub. This discourse of balanced development and improving welfare of “all Korean 
people” is guise for guiding chaebol investment in inter-Korean projects and gaining access to cheap 
DPRK labour for manufacturing, recognised during the 2000 inter-Korean summit (MOU, 2000: 15). 
The White Paper acts as a signal of the administration’s intentions: a liberalised economy, but with 
heavy state-led investment in the North. It would appear the most determinative cause for this 
discourse would be the Kim Dae-jung administration’s economic anxiety over being heavily 
dependent on FDI, and declaring it requires direct control over its economic affairs with the North, 
as a securitised project, with chaebol enterprises and thereby securitising the economic development of 
the DPRK. 
iii. The DPRK – From adversary, to responsible partner 
These documents slowly absolve the DPRK, as a state and political system, of infractions 
against the ROK over time. The 1996 Paper depicted the regime clearly as a dictatorship that was a 
primary obstacle to peace and security on the peninsula. President Kim Young-sam appeared reluctant 
to meet with Chairman Kim Il-sung and wanted the talks to have a clear purpose: nuclear 
disarmament. In 2001, discussion of the DPRK radically changed. It was no longer in direct opposition 
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with the ROK, but rather a clear and stable partner that was absorbed in unnecessary Cold War 
ideology, which the Paper also blames the ROK of similar faults. Thus, it shifted the blame of 
continued instability to both sides, that both must overcome. Finally, once inter-Korean projects made 
progress, the 2005 White Paper was often quick to portray the DPRK as a responsible and appreciative 
partner. In addition, although it raised the issues of human rights and defectors, the narrative quickly 
deflected blame away from the DPRK.  
Looking for causes to this paradigm shift, Son argues the interactive element of Sunshine was 
intended to rehabilitate the DPRK to global norms and expectations while becoming interdependent 
on external trade (2004: 95). While this constructivist account is limited to accounting inter-Korean 
relations, its conclusions can effectively be transposed on to an international audience. The 2005 Paper 
aims to deflect conduct that might deteriorate the DPRK as a responsible actor while promoting its 
gratitude for the ROK in increasing inter-Korean efforts. This shows to the world that the DPRK is 
ready to re-engage with the Northeast Asian region and can be identified as a rehabilitated power. 
Moreover, it rebuts conclusions of observers like Wallace (2016) that see the DPRK’s bellicosity as a 
method to eke out financial concessions from the ROK. This was especially needed after President 
Kim Dae-jung came under heavy criticism for the “cash for summit” controversy that gave $100 
million to the regime through Hyundai Group remittances (Yonhap News Agency, 25 June 2003 
quoted in Son K-Y, 2006: 65).  
 
Figure 3 
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iv. Security – From pivotal, to underplayed, to nationalist 
Expanding from the above observation, security concerns and instability greatly reduced in 
presence in the discourse. In 1996, the possibility of an inter-Korean summit was premised on an 
effective solution to the nuclear development crisis by President Kim Young-sam, only if it effectively 
contributed to avoiding the crisis would he endeavour to meet President Kim Il-sung. In 2001, the 
security situation on the peninsula was treated as part of a broader problem of bellicosity on both 
sides, caused by the continuation of a Cold War mentality. However, in the 2005 White Paper, the 
military instability and nuclear arms crisis re-emerged as a primary discussion point of policy. Yet, it 
describes the situation as a “nuclear stand-off”, which is an especially slanted interpretation of the 
situation. During this period, the ROK had no nuclear weapons nor hosted nuclear weapons on its 
territory. A stand-off implies the two sides concerned are on an equal footing and that is simply not 
the case. Instead of interpreting the actions of the DPRK as “unilaterally withdrawing from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and developing a nuclear weapons programme in secrecy”, it chose to portray 
them as an act of self-defence in a larger security dilemma with the United States. Moreover, it 
interwove discourse of protecting “the Korean nation” from disaster. In wrapping ethnic nationalist 
rhetoric with security concerns, it securitises the threat and heightens the focus. 
It is important to understand why the 2001 White Paper downplayed the security concerns on 
the peninsula. If the intended effect is to portray the DPRK as a pacifistic actor, or at least stuck in a 
cycle of instability, then it would make sense to describe the current security environment in 2001. 
Wallace (2016) advances an explanation by arguing for appeasement. He demonstrates in a case study 
during the ROK elections, the DPRK intensified their hostile foreign policy (HFP) to try and sway 
the outcome (92-93). Once Kim Dae-jung was in power, the frequency of HFP events remained 
consistent to the previous administration from 1993-1997 (96). Michishita (2010: 134-136) concurs 
the North used missile test and nuclear diplomacy to eke appeasement out of the ‘soft’ Kim 
administration that refused to disengage from Sunshine even if missiles were tested (135). The ‘soft’ 
military approach of the administration could explain the lack of security discourse. However, using 
the data Wallace gathered for this specific period, the conflict intensity score decreased dramatically 
immediately following the June 2000 Inter-Korean summit (Wallace, 2016: 192, Appendix B), making 
2000 the most peaceful year of Kim Dae-jung’s Presidency on average. To the administration at the 
time, the agreement of no tolerated provocations would appear to have worked and the lack of 
discussion is an attempt to demote the issue away from unification discussions. 
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Kim and Lee approach the Sunshine policy through the theory of securitisation. They submit 
the lack of kind-for-kind reaction to inter-Korean confrontation was due to a governmental effort to 
bring the DPRK threat down from high politics (military) to low politics (interaction through social 
and economic means) (2011: 34). In this way, the two authors reverse the causation of the 
appeasement theorists: the discourse appears to be part of a broader strategy to transform the conflict 
to active engagement (40). This does a good job on explaining the lack of security discourse in this 
White Paper by depicting it at as an effort to desecuritise military security with the DPRK. Son 
described the security policy of Kim Dae-jung as “parallelism” in which both sides were blamed for 
escalations and instability across the DMZ (Vol. II, 2004: 308). He supported this with an excerpt 
from an interview with Lim Dong-won, the architect of the Sunshine policy, which suggested the 
DPRK’s nuclear development was in reaction to the threat of US military force (317). Therefore, 
security was demoted during the Sunshine policy and was no longer pivotal to inter-Korean 
cooperation. 
 
Figure 4 
The data (Figure 4) shows that the focus on security did not radically change from 2001 to 
2005 in total, but the 2005 White Paper only had 131 pages compared to 186 in 2001 meaning security 
appeared more regularly in 2005. Although this is a clear decrease from 1996, inter-Korean stability 
and pacifism remained throughout the Sunshine period. The security discourse is more focused on 
one specific issue; it could still be more prevalent than statements in 2001. Moreover, the nationalist 
discourse clustered around the nuclear issue.  
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Regarding the return of this discourse and combining with nationalism in 2005, the data set 
Wallace (2016) created is useful here. Although there was a flashpoint of pacifism that lasted over a 
year in Korea, on average the provocations and clashes across the DMZ did not change under Kim 
Dae-jung (192, Appendix B). Overall, the agreement was not honoured, the ROK security posture 
became significantly more passive in response to these escalations. Whereas the 2001 White Paper was 
written during a peaceful period after the Inter-Korean summit of 2000, the MOU would need to 
answer for the lack of progress on achieving stability on the peninsula. This lack of progress mandated 
a need to resecuritise the military and nuclear situation. Equally, the Roh Moo-hyun administration 
could not entirely abandon the premise of forgiveness, peace and reconciliation inherent to the 
Sunshine Policy. The MOU in 2005 employs the “parallelism” from the Kim Dae-jung administration 
and refuses to acknowledge the DPRK’s bellicosity. It portrays the issue that affects both sides of the 
DMZ, depicts the DPRK as a responsible partner, and uses nationalistic rhetoric to dramatise security, 
giving it greater salience and shows that the ROK should take the lead on security. This nationalism 
brings both immediacy and recognition to the issue.    
v. Economics – From nationalist, to “business as usual” 
 
Figure 5 
Figure 5 shows a noticeable drop in the application of nationalist discourse across this period.  
The portrayal of economic integration was similarly nationalistic between the 1996 and 2001 White 
Papers. However, the discourse on improving Korean welfare disappeared in 2005. Instead, the bulk 
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of the content was devoted to data on inter-Korean trade. At first glance, this would seem to suggest 
that the 2005 White Paper is less interested in carrying out full unification.  However, this helps 
confirm the hypothesis that ethnic nationalism is used to securitise a desired policy change.  
 
Figure 6 
In prosperity (Figure 6), there was a decline in usage from 2001 to 2005. As explained above, 
the historical context can explain the sharp increase of usage in 2001. The Kim Young-sam 
administration devoted much energy to globalising the Korean economy. Shin records that 
globalisation in the ROK, rather than internationalise, intensified national identity out of self-
preservation and a push to remain national competitive, appropriating global trade while staying firmly 
in control (2006: 211-214). While the 1996 and 2001 Papers were promoting the potential for inter-
Korean economic integration, 2005 catalogued the progress made on the inter-Korean projects so far. 
Projects advocated for in 1996 in 2001 have been established and were functioning. In this way, it 
became “business as usual”, before it remained undecided but required promotion: the method for 
promotion is ethnic nationalism. The decrease in prosperity prevalence confirms this conception as 
inter-Korean economic cooperation became institutionalised. Thus, ethnic nationalism was used to 
express an internal desire of the ROK government to shift its economic model under the auspices of 
developing its northern brethren. 
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e. Summary of the Period 
Words and phrases of an ethnic nationalist character serve several purposes in these policy 
documents. Firstly, they have been used to express a dissatisfaction with the current balance-of-power 
with an ally, using notions of creating a single state and cultural homogeneity to push diplomacy 
towards a more favourable direction and to gain further influence over the ROK’s position in the 
relationship. Later, it was used to indicate and signal to the reader what policies it will emphasise when 
approaching the North: from promoting further economic integration and interdependence, to 
resuming talks on denuclearisation and security. Finally, once the promotion of a certain norm has 
been effectively internalised, it appears the discourse tapers-off, along with economics in 2005. Ethnic 
nationalism played a fundamental role in highlighting the importance of certain values and policies the 
ROK will take vis-à-vis the North, and perhaps have an influence on the US strategy towards the North 
as well.  
f. Moving out of Sunshine: White Papers 2010-2016 
Now it is important to analyse how the right wing Grand National/Saenuri/Liberty Korea 
Party treats established norms with the DPRK. In analysing the four White Papers in this period (2010, 
2013, 2014, 2016), it became clear that much of the content was repetitive. As such, the themes of this 
period will be summarised under one section. Moreover, because this is outside of the investigative 
period, the author shall not consider explanations and will focus on the state of ethnic nationalist 
discourse and the interpretations of unification. 
i. The DPRK as an illegitimate power 
The Papers consistently affirm the DPRK is unreliable, aggressive, and illegitimate as a partner 
for unification. The Lee Myung-bak administration sought to continue the policies of previous 
administrations (MOU, 2010: 17) pushing for “a relationship that is mutually beneficial” (MOU, 2013: 
16) based on returns in kind. In almost every section of economic activities, communications, 
humanitarian issues, the White Papers preface the discussion with instances of the DPRK unilaterally 
obstructing ‘progress’. For 2010, the event brought up was the sinking of the Cheonan in March. Even 
the progress on economic exchanges was mired by criticism over the DPRK’s actions, such as nuclear 
tests, missile launches, and suspension of communications (MOU, 2010: 57). However, when the 
DPRK seeks returns, like stopping propaganda posters dropped over North Korea or suspensions of 
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the ROK-US Joint military exercises, the Paper dismisses the demands outright (MOU, 2016: 16) so 
there is a clear double standard. The Papers are very detailed about every minor action that the DPRK 
unilaterally took such as demanding a wage hike (2016: 86), changing the times for an inter-Korean 
meeting (181), and shutting down the GIC in 2008 (MOU, 2010: 103). Both 2014 and 2016 discuss 
the Trust-Building Process as a key concept, which resembles Sunshine-era trends, but there is no 
elaboration what exactly the ROK will do to develop trust. 
Additionally, the White Papers are disinterested in improving dialogue. The most drastic 
expression of this disinterest is the 2013 Paper, which dedicates just 9 pages to inter-Korean dialogue 
(MOU, 2013: 156-164). Moreover, despite the talk of mutual benefit and conditionality, there is no 
expectation for the DPRK to do anything to bring about further interdependence, let alone 
unification. It appears the ROK government perceives unification with the DPRK regime as 
unachievable. By listing its failed attempts at dialogue, it conveys to the reader an impasse where 
relations and normalisation are unachievable. As a result, the entire Paper feels like it is talking over 
the North’s head; it appeals to numerous regional and international powers (MOU, 2014: 284-286) 
and Koreans living in diaspora in Central Asia (286). The consequence of this is that efforts for phased 
unification are rendered irrelevant, it is no longer considered practical nor desirable, yet the 
publications continue. 
 
Figure 7 
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ii. The ROK as a responsible international actor 
Contrasting with the DPRK, the Paper depicts the ROK as a responsible, capable, and 
cooperative international power. For all initiatives, it focuses on what it has achieved and how it can 
achieve more in the future, by itself. In all Papers, there is always a chapter dedicated to education, 
called “capacity building and laying the groundwork” in 2010 (MOU, 2010: 212). However, there is 
no discussion on what kind of unification shall manifest. This author infers preparedness for a 
unilateral unification in a hypothetical scenario of DPRK regime collapse. If true, the discourse 
demonstrating the ROK to be a responsible actor could be its way of showing its capacity to the 
international community. This extends beyond unification, one of the only original propositions under 
the Park Geun-hye administration for inter-Korean cooperation was the World Eco Peace Park along 
the DMZ and joint environmental committee to preserve the habitat (MOU, 2016: 57-61). This project 
seems especially removed from the goal of inter-Korean coordination. Rather, it appears to be an 
appeal to creating an ecological record for the international image of the ROK. 
While pivoting away from interacting and engaging with the DPRK, there is a risk of appearing 
to be abandoning humanitarian concerns, so the Papers make sure that contributions are remembered. 
Notably is the TamiFlu vaccinations, which was raised repetitiously and in different contexts (MOU, 
2010: 112 & 126). This shows the ROK is not giving up on previous pledges for humanitarian aid 
thereby portraying itself as ethical. When this is the only mention of inter-Korean development, the 
image of North Koreans changes dramatically. 
Interestingly, the GIC remains part of the White Papers with detailed reports on development 
and planned expansion. However, this discourse is focused on the safety of the South Korean workers 
and the safety of international and domestic investment. It does not mention how these developments 
will engender further cooperation between the two Koreas. Therefore, the GIC becomes detached 
from the larger goal in which it was established, inter-Korean cooperation, and is an investment 
opportunity for international business instead. 
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Figure 8 
iii. The North Koreans as victims 
As opposed to nationalistic rhetoric of Korean glory and commonality, the Papers depict 
North Koreans as passive objects to regime oppression.  
Notably, the Papers greatly expand discussion of the human rights situation in the North. 
Compared to the previously dismissive tone in dealing with human rights, these Papers are more 
responsive to the UN condemnations and report by UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korean 
Human Rights. Each Paper consistently shows the ROK voted in favour of annual resolutions 
condemning the human rights situation in the DPRK (MOU, 2016: 147) and incorporating this in 
their domestic law (151-153). By doing this, the MOU has mainstreamed human rights and securitising 
it as an objective, or demand, when interacting with the DPRK. 
All of these documents feature similar sections on support for North Korean ‘refugees’. These 
refugees are considered part of the separated families issue “who also suffer from national division” 
(MOU, 2010: 168), meaning they are pained from being separated from the South. They note that 
negative public opinion will interrupt the refugees’ chances at integrating into ROK society, thus 
discusses the effect of public exposure campaigns and TV programmes (MOU, 2013: 196). Yet the 
Papers don’t recognise a need for the South society to change to accommodate these differences in 
culture. Like previous observations, it would appear it is promoting Southern politics and culture as 
the most appropriate for the Korean race. Similarly, the children of North Korean refugees born in 
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third countries were considered “socially disadvantaged” when being chosen for universities (MOU, 
2016: 215). Instead of disclosing a policy to ease this social disadvantage, combating discrimination, 
the Paper focuses on relieving the financial burden instead. Again, the social setting these refugees 
would arrive in seems set in stone and entirely non-negotiable. Despite being portrayed as damaged 
victims, the refugees will adapt and settle to the hyper-capitalistic South, there is no other way nor 
synthesis as in 1996.  
 
Figure 9 
Figure 9 demonstrates that nationalist discourse was on a downward trend overall but did 
increase from 2005 to 2010. The 2010-2016 period consistently uses nationalistic discourse less than 
the Sunshine period. Still the White Papers do recognise North Koreans as their own people but focus 
on the “national pain of division” through family reunions and caring for refugees. A different form 
of ethnic nationalism complements the discourse of North Korean refugees. Compared to the 
Sunshine period documents, the ethnic nationalist discourse is focused on improving the lives and 
conditions of DPRK defectors. Rather than pushing an optimistic narrative of a prosperous, equally-
developed Korea that has two functional partners, these White Papers make it clear the ROK is 
dedicated to reaching out and supporting defectors for when the ROK might have to step in and 
absorb an additional 20 million citizens. 
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iv. Findings on Exiting Sunshine 
The transition out of Sunshine is a sharp one. Conservative administrations from 2010 
uprooted internalised and institutionalised behaviour on how unification should come about, the 
relationship between the DPRK and the ROK, and the nature of the Korean race. The desire of a 
functional, mutually beneficial relationship with the DPRK has been eroded under the pretence of 
failed conditionality and mistrust. Conversely, the ROK has promoted itself as a responsible state 
actor that abides by all international norms and strategies, to the point of including environmental 
conservation as part of its unification strategy. Issues over security have changed to absolve the ROK 
and USA of blame and depicted the DPRK as an aggressive power failing to abide by norms of 
responsible behaviour. At the same time, the Papers have taken ownership of Koreans both overseas 
in China, Central Asia, the US, and Russia, and shown dedication to rehabilitating North Korean 
‘refugees’. Because of this, the idea of a mutually agreed settlement on unification becomes an 
increasingly distant possibility. On the other hand, it is clear that conservatives also refuse to see a 
bilateral relationship with the US as sufficient for the state’s self-interest. Therefore, these 
administrations also use speech acts of unification to forward their own agenda. 
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5.  Application  
a. Regarding the Panmunjom Declaration in 2018 
Be aware that the Declaration is substantively very different from detailed White Papers on 
unification policy. However, the MOU has not published an English language White Paper yet, so this 
is the most extensive document available. 
Upon analysis, many of the themes seen in the Sunshine Period White Papers reappear, but in 
a more direct fashion. For one, the Declaration refers to reconnecting the “blood relations” of the 
people, implying it has been diluted or sullied since the years of division. It also pushes for determining 
“the destiny of the Korean nation on their own accord” and that improving inter-Korean relations is 
the “prevalent desire of the whole nation” (Available at BBC, 2018). This is very similar to the 
discourse observed in the 1996 White Paper, excluding other actors in deciding how inter-Korean 
relations should manifest. Also, like 1996, the Declaration reaffirms the urgency of inter-Korean 
rapprochement.   
This intense language could be due to an inclusion of DPRK-born norms of nationalism inside 
the document. Academics on these norms have noted a consistent reference to purity of blood and 
racial superiority as guiding principles in many publications regarding reunification. One could easily 
point out the limitations of both studies: neither the authors live inside Korean society and whether 
the general population have similar values, and there is no way of knowing whether the enactors of 
this policy (the WPK and Chairman Kim Jong-un) share these sentiments. For the latter, it is very 
likely they would not be swayed by such romantic visions of a united Korea. On the other hand, this 
Declaration is not for them – it is intended for an international audience and for many observers, this 
adoption of the DPRK’s public rhetorical performance shows the ROK is willing to utilise some of 
its created norms of bloodline and racial purity for a certain effect.  
The Declaration also continues the timeline of rapprochement from where it was left in 
October 4th, 2007 with the last high-level inter-Korean summit and reaffirms a commitment to 
balanced development and reintegration of transport links previously seen in the 2005 White Paper. 
Although the staffers between all Liberal administrations are distinct from each other, the policies 
advocated have a clear element of consistency and build upon each other. It is worthy to see how 
quickly the two Koreas can pick up exactly from where they left off over ten years ago. Further, this 
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declaration shows more willingness to compromise with the DPRK than the 2010-2016 White Papers, 
ending the leaflet distributions and loudspeaker campaigns along the DMZ which was outright 
rejected in 2016 (MOU, 2016: 156). 
The intended effect, looking at circumstances leading up to this meeting, appears to be a signal 
to the US that the ROK is ready to lead on diplomatic projects with the DPRK. By tying this 
Declaration with exclusionary, exceptional language based around racial commonality and purity, it 
indicates that the issue should be primarily dealt with the two Koreas and that it will be 
internationalised at their own pace and accord. This continued rhetoric has had a powerful effect on 
the conduct of the US administration. After the summit, there was much tension between President 
Trump and DPRK media outlets, leading to an abrupt cancellation of the US-DPRK summit in 
Singapore on June 12th. In response, the ROK Cabinet made it clear that they would continue along 
the path of rapprochement with or without the US (Available at CNBC (Kemp: 2018)). Fortunately, 
the summit was uncancelled and led to a US-DPRK Joint Declaration. This shows that ethnic 
nationalism and exceptionalism increases in both intensity and degree in instances where external 
actors take away too much autonomy away from the ROK, irrespective of the administration’s political 
leaning. Moreover, this author submits the vague nature of the US-DPRK Joint Declaration is at least 
in part due to the ROK taking a more dominant lead in diplomatic relations, relegating the US to a 
‘rubber stamp’. 
Judging by the discourse, the Moon Jae-in administration is establishing inroads to re-securitise 
rapprochement with the DPRK, promoting its benefit in easing the pain of national division and 
maintaining bloodline, something outside observers cannot understand. On initial observation, the 
agreement is more in-line with the 1996 approach, pushing for independent and bilateral efforts. 
Unlike the events around 1996, President Moon has made the ROK indispensable as an intermediary 
between the US-DPRK nuclear negotiations. As a veteran of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, one 
can speculate that his policy towards would be like what came before. However, this stronger push to 
both incorporate, yet simultaneously guide the hawkish President Trump in interactions with 
Pyongyang shows a clear departure from the divided approach seen under Sunshine. Regardless, the 
ROK shall continue securitising and taking ownership of certain elements in interactions with the 
DPRK by channelling its incomprehensible experience of national division and stay present as an 
overseer on all US-DPRK summits moving forward. 
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Due to this, President Moon would likely be willing to continue efforts on a bilateral basis. 
Although the US has responded positively to rapprochement, the steps for denuclearisation are 
sufficiently vague that conflicts may arise over its interpretation5. Should the efforts be successful, 
though, President Moon would favour further economic integration with the Northeast Asian region 
and begin new inter-Korean economic projects like President Kim Dae-jung and securitise balanced 
economic development as part of greater Korean welfare. Likewise, if the current agreement falls apart 
and hostilities continue, the Moon administration looks poised to advocate for further nuclear 
diplomacy and denuclearisation incentives such as KEDO and securitise it through ethnic nationalist 
discourse. 
  
                                                           
5 Full text available at: “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman 
Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit”. (2018) last accessed 1st July 2018 
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6. Conclusion 
Speech acts on unification should be analysed more holistically moving forward. The 
application of ethnic nationalism has been shown to be a fundamental political tool in reporting how 
Liberal administrations will approach the North regarding unification. Ethnic nationalism frames the 
approach to unification and securitises certain self-interested foreign policy goals. As hypothesised, it 
combines in areas of specific importance to each respective administration and behaves as a device 
for securitisation of an issue. Through imparting notions of racial and cultural homogeneity, the ROK 
signals to the international community that they view the DPRK as part of their nation and claims 
both belonging and “ownership” over the issues that arise in their relationship. Simultaneously, it 
applies national strife and pain over division to grant itself further autonomy and independence. Thus, 
the triangular relationship between the USA and the two Koreas is avoided and instead puts the USA 
behind the ROK as a follower rather than a leader. Surprisingly, many of the themes in the Sunshine 
period began in nascent during President Kim Young-sam’s term in clear frustration regarding the 
ROK’s relative position in the world and the ideas clearly developed during this period. 
 Interestingly, contrary to the hypothesis, ethnic nationalism does not disappear entirely from 
2010 to 2016 but are reinterpreted. Instead of portraying the North as a reliable partner, these 
administrations view the DPRK as unreliable and unworkable, viewing the people as victims. The 
documents promoted the ROK as an effective and autonomous middle power throughout this period; 
it does not consign itself to complying with the US’ wishes, and still declares independent diplomacy 
with Russia and China (arguably the DPRK’s closest allies). These respective White Papers are closest 
to a public image piece, showing the ROK as responsible and benevolent, contrasted with the DPRK’s 
irresponsibility and incompetence. In this manner, unification has been used as a way for the ROK to 
sell itself, portraying itself as successful versus the DPRK’s failure; an internationalised and reliable 
power with a modern and ‘advanced’ culture. This only intensified as time went on, expanding the 
topics of discussion to regional development, nuclear energy, environmental protection, and education 
of Korean culture. Thus, the discussion of unification will not disappear under further Conservative 
administrations, it still serves a practical purpose. However, the expansion of agenda items has 
obfuscated the ontology of unification that it has lost a clear meaning requiring a concerted effort to 
put cooperation with the DPRK at the forefront.  
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 The Panmunjom Declaration shares themes to previous inter-Korean summits and policies 
advocated in the White Papers. Nevertheless, there are clear efforts to bring the DPRK back into 
unification policies with more ambitious goals and summits. The ROK was able to achieve a functional 
relationship with the DPRK so quickly because ethnic nationalism is both malleable and long-lasting, 
allowing for the two Koreas to resume the nature of their relationship from over a decade ago. 
Moreover, the ROK is again the lead diplomat in approaching the DPRK, setting the agenda for the 
United States. In all, it would be beneficial for future research to understand the concept of unification 
is much broader in scope than interactions between the two Koreas: it is a purposefully designed and 
utilised speech act with a variety of self-interested purposes for the ROK. 
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8.  Appendices 
a. Appendix A 
Timeline of events 
ROK events          DPRK events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25th February 1993: Kim 
Young-sam elected. 
8th July 1994: Death of Kim 
Il-sung. 
25th February 1998: Kim 
Dae-jung elected. 
21st October 1994: Signing 
of Agreed Framework. 
~2H 1997: ROK Financial 
Crisis. 
23rd October 2000: Hosted 
Madeleine Albright. 
13th June 2000: First Inter-
Korean leader summit. 
13th June 2000: First Inter-
Korean leader summit. 
~2H 1994: “The Arduous 
March” famine. 
6th October 2000: Joint US-
DPRK Statement on 
International Terrorism. 
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25th February 2003: Roh 
Moo-hyun elected. 
25th February 2008: Lee 
Myung-bak elected. 
10th January 2003: 
Withdrawal from NPT. 
9th October 2006: Nuclear 
test. 
25th May 2009: Second 
nuclear test. 
27th August 2003: First 
round of six-party talks. 
26th March 2010: Allegedly 
sank ROKS Cheonan. 
2nd October 2007: Second 
Inter-Korean leader summit. 
2nd October 2007: Second 
Inter-Korean leader summit. 
27th August 2003: First 
round of six-party talks. 
25th February 2004: Second 
round of six-party talks. 
25th February 2004: Second 
round of six-party talks. 
23rd June 2004: Third round 
of six-party talks. 
23rd June 2004: Third round 
of six-party talks. 
26th July 2005: Fourth round 
of six-party talks. 
26th July 2005: Fourth round 
of six-party talks. 
9th November 2005: Fifth 
round of six-party talks. 
9th November 2005: Fifth 
round of six-party talks. 
19th March 2007: Sixth 
round of six-party talks. 
19th March 2007: Sixth 
round of six-party talks. 
27th June 2008: Destroyed 
Yongbyon cooling tower. 
6th October 2002: Hosted 
US Assistant Secretary of 
State John Kelly. 
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25th February 2013: Park 
Geun-hye elected. 
10th May 2017: Moon Jae-in 
elected. 
23rd November 2010: 
Shelled Yeonpyeong Island. 
12th February 2013: Third 
nuclear test. 
6th January 2016: Fourth 
nuclear test. 
9th September 2016: Fifth 
nuclear test. 
3rd September 2017: Sixth 
nuclear test. 
12th June 2018: Met President 
Trump in Singapore. 
27th April 2018: Panmunjom 
summit and declaration. 
27th April 2018: Panmunjom 
summit and declaration. 
51 
S2068419 
Appendix B 
Keywords in 1996 - latent 
Categories Number 
Activism 37 
Nationalism 167 
Security against North 99 
Prosperity 80 
Keywords in 2001 - latent 
Categories Number 
Activism 36 
Nationalism 110 
Security against North 39 
Prosperity 153 
Keywords in 2005 - latent 
Categories  Number 
Activism 2 
Nationalism 33 
Security against North 47 
Prosperity 68 
Keywords in 2010 – latent 
Categories  Number 
Activism 54 
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Nationalism 78 
Security against North 61 
Prosperity 115 
Keywords in 2013 – latent 
Categories  Number 
Activism 57 
Nationalism 42 
Security against North 90 
Prosperity 63 
Keywords in 2014 – latent 
Categories  Number 
Activism 65 
Nationalism 47 
Security against North 89 
Prosperity 68 
Keywords in 2016 – latent 
Categories  Number 
Activism 49 
Nationalism 43 
Security against North 55 
Prosperity 56 
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Appendix C 
Keywords in 1996 - manifest 
Categories  Number 
Activism 71 
Nationalism 357 
Security against North 132 
Prosperity 116 
Keywords in 2001 - manifest 
Categories  Number 
Activism 59 
Nationalism 246 
Security against North 50 
Prosperity 215 
Keywords in 2005 - manifest 
Categories  Number 
Activism 8 
Nationalism 65 
Security against North 50 
Prosperity 129 
Keywords in 2010 - manifest 
Categories  Number 
Activism 91 
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Nationalism 253 
Security against North 86 
Prosperity 208 
 
Keywords in 2013 - manifest 
Categories  Number 
Activism 93 
Nationalism 237 
Security against North 114 
Prosperity 131 
Keywords in 2014 - manifest 
Categories  Number 
Activism 95 
Nationalism 316 
Security against North 102 
Prosperity 182 
Keywords in 2016 - manifest 
Categories  Number 
Activism 77 
Nationalism 290 
Security against North 81 
Prosperity 145 
 
